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JURISPRUDENCE—MERELY JUDGMENT: A
FALLIBILIST ACCOUNT OF THE RULE OF LAW
BRUCE MILLER*
How should judges decide the cases presented to them? In our system
the answer is, “according to law,” as opposed to the judge’s preferred
outcomes. But for at least a century, skeptics have cast doubt on whether
adjudication under law is possible. Judge Richard Posner, now retired
from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, has, for example,
argued that the indeterminacy of legal argument and the influence of
judges’ predispositions show that it is not. Judge Posner thus
recommends that judges give up on the rule of law in contested cases and
instead candidly base their decisions on what they take to be in the best
interests of society.
Is there a convincing response to Judge Posner’s critique? H.L.A. Hart
famously sought to defend the rule of law as a law of rules, grounded in
judges’ acceptance of a “Rule of Recognition,” as the ultimate basis for
their decisions. But Hart’s reliance on agreement among judges,
coupled with his acknowledgement of an “open texture” where the Rule
of Recognition breaks down, renders his explanation unhelpful to a judge
confronted with seriously competing arguments.
Ronald Dworkin’s interpretive account of the rule of law asks judges to
ground their decisions on principles that best fit with applicable preexisting law and accord with the most persuasive political justification
for that law. Dworkin offers ample prescriptive guidance to judges, but
his concession that no interpretation of law can be proven correct seems
to reinforce rather than rebut Judge Posner’s skepticism.

* Bruce Miller taught at Western New England University Law School from 1980 until
his retirement in 2020.
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The fallibilist approach to inquiry, which grew out of the American
Pragmatist tradition, offers a promising, anti-skeptical defense of
Dworkin’s interpretive justification for adjudication under law.
Fallibilism explains all inquiry as a process that begins with doubt and
through investigation ends with the production of belief. From the
internal perspective of the inquirer, the belief so produced is the only
truth inquiry is capable of generating. But because the belief cannot be
proven true, the inquirer recognizes that it is fallible, and thus subject to
revision through subsequent inquiry.
Fallibilism blunts the force of Judge Posner’s critique. By providing a
grounding for Dworkin’s account of adjudication that reconciles the
search for truth with the persistence of controversy, it shows that the rule
of law is possible.

INTRODUCTION: IS THE RULE OF LAW AN ILLUSION?
How should judges decide the cases presented to them? In our legal
system, the straightforward answer is obvious—judges should decide
cases by applying the law to the relevant facts of each case. This
aspiration is what allows us to claim that we are governed by the rule of
the law, or, to depersonalize the claim, that ours is a government of law
and not of men [sic]. But what does this separation of laws, of the sources
of legal legitimacy (the laws), from the people who apply them (the men)
mean?
Perhaps it is easier to start with a suggestion of what it conventionally
does not, or at least should not, mean: Judges should not decide cases
according to the outcomes they would prefer. These preferences can
themselves derive from many sources—a judge’s social background or
identity, for example, but also her view of wise social policy or her moral
values. For a judge to rely on these personal perspectives or convictions,
her “priors,” as Judge Richard Posner calls them,1 to decide the fate of the
contending parties in front of her, is to abandon her obligation to apply the
law in favor of an exercise of pure will. This is precisely what Alexander
Hamilton condemned in his Federalist 78 defense of the political
legitimacy of judicial review.2 A decision according to a judge's

1. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
28, 116, 137–140, 148–151 (2017) [hereinafter THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY]; RICHARD A.
POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS: THE ACADEMY AND THE JUDICIARY 17–18 (2016) [hereinafter
DIVERGENT PATHS]; RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 106, 121 (2010) [hereinafter
HOW JUDGES THINK].
2. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
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preference or will flouts her duty to the parties and to society, because it
comes from her instead of being grounded in law.
But what does it mean for a decision to be grounded in law? For one
thing, it means that the sources of law used to decide a case must preexist
the case itself. If these sources are created by the judge in an act of
deciding a case, the decision cannot, even in principle, be more than an
iteration of her priors. In addition, what can count as a source of law
cannot be completely open-ended. The premises from which a judge’s
justification of her decision proceeds must have some limiting pedigree,
whether it be social or moral. Without a way to distinguish legal from
nonlegal arguments, it is impossible to claim that any decision is grounded
in law.
These requirements—preexisting and limited sources—are
themselves pretty minimal, and they are offered in a spirit of fallibilism.
Arguments that either or both are dispensable to the rule of law cannot be
ruled out. But they do capture the narrative and rhetorical form of most
(though certainly not all) published judicial opinions, perhaps the best
evidence of our current conventions about adjudication.
But however ecumenical and congruent with our formal practices,
these conditions for identifying decisions based on law may thoroughly
fail to exclude the baleful influence of a judge’s priors. Any judicial
opinion can be written to conform to the requirements that it be based on
pre-existing and limited sources and to conceal its roots in the judges’
policy preferences or personal convictions, maybe even from the writer
herself. About a century ago, the American Legal Realists began to point
out that extant legal doctrines and accepted modes of legal argument can
be deployed to justify either outcome in any contested case.3 This critique
was convincingly amplified a generation ago by commentators associated
with the Critical Legal Studies movement, who correctly emphasized the
absence of any test by which right outcomes could be distinguished from
wrong ones.4 Perhaps the judges’ priors are inevitably the primary drivers
3. Some classic Legal Realist texts making this point are: OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: THE CLASSIC
LECTURES ON THE LAW AND LAW SCHOOLS (Oxford Univ. Press, 11th ed. 2008) (1930); Felix
S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809
(1935); L. L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429 (1934); Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
4. Leading Critical Legal Studies pieces are: Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over
Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards:
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of the results of most, maybe even all, cases. If so, the rule of law, at least
if understood as requiring decisions according to pre-existing, properly
pedigreed norms may be, and may always have been, illusory.
I. THE SKEPTICISM OF A PROMINENT JUDGE
Much popular discussion of adjudication, at least that which focuses
on its most rarefied venues, the U.S. Supreme Court and the Federal
Appeals Courts, takes this breakdown for granted. The Judges who sit in
these courts are routinely described in ideological terms as liberals or
conservatives5 and often appear to have been nominated precisely because
of their ideological commitments.6 The Supreme Court frequently
resolves important, controversial cases by a vote of 5–4,7 with Justices
appearing to align along a predictable liberal/conservative axis. Senate
confirmation hearings for Supreme Court nominees have devolved into a
sort of Kabuki-like ritual, with nominees striving to conceal their political
commitments in plain sight and steadfastly avoiding all but the most
cliched discussion of the judicial role.8 Chief Justice Roberts’ oft-repeated
observation, at his own confirmation hearing, that judges are like home
plate umpires in baseball, neutrally calling balls and strikes, is mostly
derided as either self-delusionally naive or consciously duplicitous.9
Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984); Critical Legal Studies Symposium, 36 STAN.
L. REV. 1 (1984).
5. See Adam Liptak, Court Under Roberts Is Most Conservative in Decades, N.Y. TIMES
(July
24,
2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/us/25roberts.html
[https://perma.cc/8MWX-PURZ]; Chris Hayes Podcast with Dahlia Lithwick, Why is This
Happening? MSNBC (Mar. 15, 2020, 7:48 PM), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=vpz7Z13nNJk [https://perma.cc/PF5D-FKDP].
6. See Rebecca R. Ruiz et al., A Conservative Agenda Unleashed on the Federal Courts,
NY TIMES (March 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/14/us/trump-appeals-courtjudges.html [https://perma.cc/J6DP-RGVU].
7. Examples from the last decade include: Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S.Ct. 735 (2020);
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018);
Whole Womens’ Health Care v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016); Michigan v. EPA, 576
U.S. 743 (2015); Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320 (2015); Fisher v.
University of Texas, 570 U.S. 297 (2013); Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013);
Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Humanitarian Law Project
v. Holder, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
8. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice
of the United States: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55–57, 549–641
(2005) [hereinafter John G. Roberts]; Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Neil M.
Gorsuch to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 499–575 (2017); Confirmation Hearing on the
Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1343–152 (2009).
9. See John G. Roberts, supra note 8, at 56.
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One of the most prominent and prolific federal appellate judges to
have served in the past half century, Judge Richard Posner of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, has written extensively and often
passionately about the contradiction between the conventional rhetoric
that purports to explain and justify the rule of law and what he believes
judges actually do, and indeed must do, in order to decide cases.10 Judge
Posner believes he was appointed because of his presumed commitment
to the “plain meaning” method of reading legal texts and to “strict
construction” of the Constitution.11 And his early judicial career appeared
to reflect a belief that by adherence to conventional sources of law, he
could resolve cases both correctly and in a way that eliminated the
influence of his own priors.12
In recent years, though, Judge Posner has turned away from this faith
in what he now pejoratively calls formalism, toward something like its
opposite.13 In his most recent book on judging, The Federal Judiciary:
Strengths and Weaknesses,14 Judge Posner argues, for example, that
adherents to the plain meaning school have simply provided themselves
with a license to cut off discussion of contested legal questions by fiat,
declaring that their own preferred answers to these questions just happen
to accord with the plain meaning of whatever legal text is at issue.15 But
Posner’s criticism of the conventional rhetoric of adjudication extends
beyond just disdain for judicial claims to channel plain meaning. He is
now skeptical about the utility of legal reasoning more generally.16 In
many (though, significantly, not all) contested cases, Posner maintains
that the conventional sources and methods of decision offered by legal
argumentation do not help judges reach the right answer.17 For Posner,
the backward-looking focus of legal analysis on textual language,
precedent cases, and settled principles and doctrinal rules of law—indeed
10. HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 1; DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 1, at 74–221; THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY, supra note 1, passim.
11. DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 1, at 76–92; HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 1, at
41–56.
12. Posner discusses his own evolution from what he calls formalism to legal realism in
detail. DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 1, at 76–92; HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 1, at 41–
56.
13. Posner’s anti-formalism, or even anti-legalism, as he sometimes puts it, is set out in
detail in THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, supra note 1, at 50–55, 77–82, 147–51, and in DIVERGENT
PATHS, supra note 1, at 76-78.
14. THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, supra note 1 at 50–55, 77–82, 147–51.
15. Id. at 54–55, 80–81, 385–86.
16. Id. at 86–101.
17. Id.
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the entire practice of interpreting previously promulgated sources of
law—is often self-deceiving, wrongheaded, or both.18 The purported
application of these sources is really a pretense for decision according to
the judge’s policy preferences or an unthinking veneration of obsolete
ideas.19 Moreover, when judges do not agree on the correct application of
legal sources, “there is no analytical method of determining who is right—
no [settled] means of enforcing agreement or concession.”20
Faced with this unworkable blend of indeterminacy, illusion and
archaism, Posner urges judges to abandon reliance on pre-existing sources
of law and methods of interpreting them in favor of “decid[ing] [] case[s]
in a way that will comport with common sense and the fundamental ethical
norms of society and have overall good consequences . . . . The
implication, which I do not shrink from, . . . is that the judicial role is to a
considerable extent legislative.”21 To his credit, Posner also urges, but
does not expect, candor from any judges who would adopt his
recommendation.22 He realizes, apparently, that any judge who openly
acknowledged the absence of constraint by legal sources and methods of
argument would concede that we are governed by her preferred social
policies, or her priors, rather than by the rule of law.
II. H.L.A. HART AND THE FAILURE OF THE LAW OF RULES
Significantly, Judge Posner admits that judges are not always
unbound by law. Some cases are indeed resolvable by interpreting and
applying previously promulgated legal sources.23 In these cases, he
concedes, judges ought not impose their views of the best outcome, all
things considered.24 But these cases are limited, by Posner’s lights, to
those in which the legal sources and the methods of applying them align
clearly and without controversy, that is to the cases on which everyone
(save, presumably, for the losing party) agrees on the outcome and the

18. Id. at 27–28, 50–51.
19. Id. at 27–28, 50-51, 75–77.
20. Id. at 54–55.
21. Id. at 30.
22. Id. at 21–22, 115–16, 136–38.
23. See HOW JUDGES THINK supra note 1, at 269–281; THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, supra
note 1, at 80; DIVERGENT PATHS supra note 1, at 2, 107 (quoting Holmes “Judges Must
Legislate, but Only Interstitially”), 176–78.
24. See sources cited supra, note 23.
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reasons for it.25 Here, Judge Posner seems to invoke an extreme version
of the defense of the rule of law articulated by the eminent British
philosopher, H.L.A. Hart in the early 1960s. Hart argued that the law a
judge ought to apply derived from the sources of law and methods of
analysis used by judges acting in the deciding judge’s legal system
generally.26 It is the shared acceptance of practices for deciding cases that
validates a particular judge’s use of them and, hence, justifies her decision
as one arrived at under law.27 In short, for Hart, a judge’s obligation to
decide cases according to law is met when her decisions adhere to criteria
recognized as valid by her legal community.28
Hart did not deny that a judge’s application of this principle, which
he famously called the “Rule of Recognition,” could be controversial:
No doubt the practice of judges . . . in which the actual existence of a
rule of a rule of recognition consists, is a complex matter. . . . [T]here
are certainly situations in which questions as to the precise content and
scope of this kind of rule, and even as to its existence, may not admit
of a clear or determinate answer.29

Still, Hart believed that his account of decisions made according to
law could accommodate this uncertainty, so long as judges normally
subscribed to “a unified or shared official acceptance of the Rule of
Recognition containing the system’s criteria of validity.”30 Hart also
acknowledged that adjudication under criteria provided by the rule of
recognition was not mechanical. Only in a world “characterized only by
a finite number of features, and these together with all the modes in which
they could combine were known to us,”31 could the question of how to
apply law in a particular case be settled in advance and never involve, “at
the point of actual application, a fresh choice between open
alternatives.”32 For Hart, this was emphatically not our world. “[T]he
necessity for such choice is thrust upon us because we are men [sic], not
gods.”33
25. Id. See HOW JUDGES THINK supra note 1, at 79, where Posner distinguishes between
cases where the “law falls short,” requiring judicial legislation, from those where law is
sufficient to decide the case.
26. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 77-150 (1961).
27. Id. at 97–107, 142.
28. Id. at 112–14.
29. Id. at 106.
30. Id. at 111.
31. Id. at 125.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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For Hart, a concession that judicial discretion is inevitable did not
undermine his defense of the rule of law because, he believed, the need
for judges to exercise it is relatively rare. Here, Hart appealed to the
distinction between clear cases, where the relevant ground for decision is
uncontroversial (where the rule “certainly applies”)34 and those where
“there are reasons for both asserting and denying”35 that the claimed
ground for a decision actually governs the outcome. While admitting that
“[n]othing can eliminate this duality of a core of certainty and a penumbra
of doubt,”36 Hart insisted that this inevitable “open texture”37 in the law
occurred only at its fringe and thus did not threaten the law’s generally
settled meaning. Most cases, certainly enough to validate the system as a
whole, lay within the central core, safely governed by the Rule of
Recognition.
We can almost see Judge Posner preparing to pounce: What if, as in
our own current legal culture, there is little or no agreement among our
warring armies of liberal and conservative judges on any proffered Rule
of Recognition? Even if a measure of very abstract agreement on the
content of such a Rule can be identified, what if all, or nearly all, contested
cases are argued within Hart’s penumbra of doubt? Posner’s point is that
our agreed upon sources of law and methods of applying them, at best,
contain only a tiny, central core, surrounded by a vast and highly porous
open texture.
Hart’s effort to rescue the rule of law from the clutches of legal
realism ends up, Posner might say, reinforcing his own skeptical position.
Perhaps ironically, the reason for their alignment is that Posner accepts
Hart’s conclusion that the rule of law must be a law of rules.38 For Hart,
a judge’s decision is constrained by law when it accords with the Rule of
Recognition, when it is determined by what participants in the legal
system recognize as the substance, sources and methods of legal
34. Id. at 119.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 12–32, 135, 140.
38. Posner sometimes claims that his proposed “pragmatic” method of deciding cases by
adopting the best “legislative” solution counts as adjudication under law. But this claim rests
(weakly) on the proposition that any judicial resolution of a case is, ipso facto, one entitled to
be deemed to be under law. See, e.g., DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 1, at 176. But this
foundation is logically impossible because Posner’s basic position is that judicial legislation is
warranted, indeed optimal, precisely because of the failure of law to generate determinate
solutions. The law he refers to in this sense, is the law of rules urged by Hart. See, e.g., THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY, supra note 1, at 80, 86–95, 99–101; DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 1, at
175–77.
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argument. Posner concurs. But for Posner, except in the rare
uncontroversial case, there simply is no Rule of Recognition, and thus no
constraining law. Instead, there is endless indeterminacy and no means of
resolving it.
Hart also largely yields to Posner’s claim that the legal sources and
methods themselves play only a small role in generating the right
outcomes in contested cases. Though he insists that judges are generally
bound by rules, it is the fact of agreement among judges on the reasons
for an outcome, rather than the persuasiveness of their reasons, that places
a case within Hart’s central core.39 And when there is no agreement to be
had, a deciding judge must make a fresh, Posnerian, choice between open
alternatives, guided only, and inevitably, by her priors or policy
preferences. For Hart, no less than Posner, legal argument itself has little
justificatory force.
Nor can Hart’s appeal to agreement as the arbiter of legal truth
distinguish clear cases from controversial ones. Obviously, a case is
neither clear nor controversial, easy nor hard, until it has been presented
for resolution. When it is, it is of course true that a judge might recognize
that most or all of her peers would resolve the case in the same way. But
in our system, a judge’s acknowledgement of that consensus would not
provide justification for her own decision. As Hart concedes, we expect
judges to decide cases by applying the law itself, not their understanding
of what their peers believe the law to be.40 Certainly, an opinion that
presents its rationale in terms of deference to the presumed view of other
judges, as opposed to the deciding judge’s understanding of what is
required by the relevant legal sources (e.g., relevant precedents, principles
of law, history) would both be quite rare and generally received as
inconsistent with the independent judgment we expect judges to exercise.
If a case is easy, it is because the relevant law, not the agreement of judges
in general, makes it so.
We also sometimes maintain that previously decided cases were easy
(for Hart, within the settled core) or hard (within the penumbra, or open
texture). When we do, it is even clearer that it is not any agreement, or
Rule of Recognition, that prompts our assessment. Consider Dred Scott
v. Sandford,41 a case that is now often condemned as clearly—and
tragically, for African Americans and the nation itself—wrongly decided.
What could it mean for Dred Scott to be an easy case, albeit in the opposite
39. See HART, supra note 26, at 112–14, 123–26, 131–32, 135–37, 119–20, 143.
40. Id. at 135–37.
41. See generally Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
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direction from the way it was actually resolved? For Hart, this situation
is impossible because
[a] supreme tribunal has the last word in saying what the law is and,
when it has said it, the statement that the court was ‘wrong’ has no
consequences . . . . The decision may, of course, be deprived of legal
effect by legislation, but the very fact that resort to this is necessary
demonstrates the empty character, so far as the law is concerned, of
the statement that the court’s decision was wrong.42

If Hart is right about this, Dred Scott can now be said to be inconsistent
with the American Constitution only because it was overruled by the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. When decided, Dred Scott was
correct, simply because, under the Rule of Recognition, it was issued by
our highest court, whose rulings we regard as dispositive.
But the force of a claim that Dred Scott was legally wrong, and
obviously so, does not derive from the effect of the Post Civil War
Amendments. It depends instead on showing that Dred Scott was wrong
when decided, that it was inconsistent with the antebellum Constitution in
effect in 1857. This claim may itself be wrong, of course. William Lloyd
Garrison certainly thought so.43 Frederick Douglass did not.44 But the
claim is not incoherent, as Hart’s Rule of Recognition would have it.
The contemporary condemnation of Dred Scott might, alternatively,
warrant little more than a shrug from Hart on the ground that it wrongly
presumes that our current agreement on the meaning of the 1857
Constitution was accessible to our forebears. On this view, we can only
say that under our now shared understanding of the 1857 Constitution, our
Rule of Recognition, we retroactively deem Dred Scott to have been
wrongly decided. We cannot properly hold Chief Justice Taney to account
for having had a different understanding.
Because of this
incommensurability of perspectives, Dred Scott can never be an obviously
wrong (or right) decision; it is, like current contested cases, beyond legal
evaluation altogether.
This agonistic outlook appears to explain Judge Posner’s impatience
with the current consensus that two other infamous Supreme Court

42. HART, supra note 26, at 138.
43. Garrison called the Constitution a “covenant with death,” and an “agreement with
hell.” See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, Garrison’s Constitution: The Covenant with Death and How
It
Was
Made,
NAT’L
ARCHIVES
(2000),
https://www.archives.gov/
publications/prologue/2000/winter/garrisons-constitution-1.html
[https://perma.cc/79PUCEBH].
44. Frederick Douglass, Oration delivered at Corinthian Hall, Rochester (July 5th, 1852).
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decisions, Plessy v. Ferguson45 and Korematsu v. United States,46 were
also obviously wrongly decided. In both instances, according to Posner,
we supposedly more enlightened moderns are simply projecting our own
views backward onto judges who, in their own time and place, had their
own perfectly acceptable policy reasons for the outcomes they reached.
Law had nothing to do with either these outcomes or our subsequent
disapproval of them. For Judge Posner, our consensus that Korematsu and
Plessy were wrongly decided and clearly so, is nothing more than Monday
morning quarterbacking.47
How could the claim that Dred Scott was an easy case, for Scott rather
than Sanford, be sustained? The effort would start by examining Chief
Justice Taney’s purported justification for his decision: Taney held that
Scott, as an escaped slave claiming freedom under the authority of an act
of Congress, could not be a citizen of the United States, and, therefore, of
any state in the union, for purposes of Federal Court diversity jurisdiction.
We think [slaves] are not, and that they are not included, and were not
intended to be included under the word “citizens” in the constitution,
and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that
instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States.48

Taney’s rationale was rooted in his understanding of the Declaration
of Independence and his presumption that its signers were too
distinguished to be capable of hypocrisy:
The language of the Declaration of Independence is equally
conclusive:
It begins by declaring that, "[w]hen in the course of human events it
becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands
which have connected them with another, and to assume among the
powers of the earth the separate and equal station to which the laws of
nature and nature's God entitle them, a decent respect for the opinions
of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel
them to the separation."
It then proceeds to say: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that
all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable rights; that among them is life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights, Governments are

45. See generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
46. See generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
47. FEDERAL JUDICIARY, supra note 1, at 51–52; see RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW,
PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY 294 (2003).
48. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404 (1857).
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instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed.”
The general words above quoted would seem to embrace the whole
human family, and if they were used in a similar instrument at this day
would be so understood. But it is too clear for dispute that the enslaved
African race were not intended to be included, and formed no part of
the people who framed and adopted this declaration, for if the
language, as understood in that day, would embrace them, the conduct
of the distinguished men who framed the Declaration of Independence
would have been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent with the principles
they asserted, and instead of the sympathy of mankind to which they
so confidently appealed, they would have deserved and received
universal rebuke and reprobation.49

If Taney’s conclusion was wrong, it is not because his twenty first century
critics have so labeled it. It is wrong because the rationale just quoted is
flawed. And there are multiple reasons why it might be. For example,
Taney’s originalist methodology, relying on the Declaration of
Independence as the source of meaning of citizenship for diversity
jurisdiction purposes, could be wrong. Perhaps a citizen was instead
someone who was understood to be one in 1857, an understanding that
might include putatively free African Americans. Alternatively, perhaps
the framers were no less capable of hypocrisy than their successors. The
Declaration of Independence was indeed universal in its proclamation of
human equality. Its framers were just unable or unwilling to acknowledge
that self-evident truth, blinded or self-deceiving as they were by their
deeply white supremacist worldview. These are just two, perhaps the two
most immediately obvious, arguments that Taney was wrong on the law
in Dred Scott. There are no doubt many others. The point is that if we
are correct to say today that Dred Scott, or Plessy, or Korematsu were not
hard cases, but easy ones, each decided wrongly, it is because these claims
are justified by sound legal arguments. And so it is as well with easy cases
that were correctly decided, Brown v. Board of Education,50 say, or
McCulloch v. Maryland.51 They are not easy because of any agreement,
or Rule of Recognition, but because of the exceptionally persuasive
arguments that can be made for them.
This does not show, of course, that Judge Posner, the legal realists, or
critical legal studies scholars have gotten things wrong.
The

49. Id. at 409–10.
50. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
51. See generally McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
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indeterminacy of legal argument may still render it useless in contested
cases. The point is that there is no difference between a hard case and an
easy one. Both are capable of resolution by law only if the efficacy of
legal argument abides despite its indeterminacy. It could still be true, as
Posner claims, that just when legal argument is needed to resolve
disagreement, it must inevitably fail because of that very same
disagreement.52
If Hart’s effort to ground legal justification in underlying consensus,
the Rule of Recognition, fails, his argument nevertheless does engage our
question: How should judges decide the cases presented to them? Hart
recognizes that any proposed answer to this question is helpful only if it
proceeds from what he calls the “internal” perspective,53 that is, the
position of the deciding judge who is a participant in (or insider to) the
system of adjudication. This internal perspective contrasts with an
“external” one, that of an observer or outsider to the system, whose goal
is to understand or explain it.54 The distinction is illustrated by how the
Rule of Recognition might appear to an outsider, say a political scientist
describing our legal system, as compared to a judge tasked with deciding
a case. From the political scientist’s external perspective, Hart’s account
of the Rule of Recognition may be accurate. The substance, sources, and
methods of adjudication in the American legal system may indeed be just
what judges, generally and over time, recognize as such.
But from the internal perspective of the deciding judge, the Rule of
Recognition fails to deliver on Hart’s goal. It has no prescriptive force for
the case in front of her, whether that case is easy or hard. As we have
seen, trying to apply it can only cause that judge to suspend her own
judgment, or worse, to decline even to make a judgment, about what the
law requires, in favor of relying on what a consensus of her similarly
situated peers would do.
Unless the judicial role is purely a pose, then, a conscientious judge
will strive to decide her cases by applying the law rather than guessing
what other judges would do. And it is for this kind of conscientious judge
that Hart is especially disappointing. Under the Rule of Recognition, the
case is either easy, because of a presumed judicial consensus, or hard, and,
therefore up for grabs, because other judges would agree that there are
plausible arguments for both sides. In neither event does a judge’s
independent understanding of the law play any role. It is either
52. See discussion supra Part I.
53. HART, supra note 26, at 134–36, 143.
54. Id. at 143.
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unnecessary, because external to the hypothesized consensus, or
insufficient, because controversial.
III. RONALD DWORKIN’S INTERPRETIVE ACCOUNT OF JUDGING
A prominent, though often sympathetic, critic of Hart, the late Ronald
Dworkin, sought to apply Hart’s internal perspective in a way that could
both describe the practice of judges more accurately and also offer useful
prescriptive advice on how they should decide cases. Significantly,
Dworkin saw the practice of adjudication as a backward looking one,
aimed at ascertaining and applying previously promulgated law, rather
than, as Posner argues, creating new law to fit the case to be decided.55
The practice is, Dworkin argued, one of interpretation.56 And an
interpretive approach, or as Dworkin would say, attitude, is one which
seeks to construct the most accurate understanding of the legal materials
relevant to the case to be resolved.
Constructing this understanding requires first that the judge identify
both the pertinent formal sources of law, for example, statutes, the
Constitution, and previously decided cases.57 The judge must then
assemble the possible, often competing and complex, ways of ascertaining
the meaning of these sources and how they might bear on the case at hand.
These methods of applying the formal sources of law might include, for
example, reasoning by analogy to previously decided cases, defining the
linguistic meaning of relevant texts, referring to the legislative history
accompanying the enactment of statutes, or the public meaning of
Constitutional provisions at the time of their adoption. Most importantly
for Dworkin, they also include the purpose, or point, of each of these
sources of law, both individually, and taken as a whole.58 Dworkin
acknowledged that even assembling these raw materials is a formidable
task (he calls his ideal judge, “Hercules”),59 and that judges will disagree
about their content, as we know they may about anything.60 Nevertheless,
it is sufficient, for Dworkin, if we are convinced that this pre-interpretive
effort is one that judges should, and generally do, undertake.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 45–86 (1986) [hereinafter LAW’S EMPIRE].
Id.
Id. at 65–66.
Id. at 65, 91–92.
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105 (1977) [hereinafter TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY]; LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 239.
60. See LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 1–44, 76–86, 87–113.
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The next step in the interpretive process is to fashion, or in Dworkin’s
words, to construct, a proposition of law that best ‘fits’ with, or explains,
the identified legal sources and methods and will, when then applied,
resolve the case to be decided.61 Dworkin recognized that it will be a rare
case in which a decisive proposition can fit with every pre-existing source
and method. Some may be in tension with one another in ways that cannot
be resolved easily, or at all. Others may properly be disregarded, as
“mistakes,” because they are striking outliers to the pre-existing law taken
as a whole.62 Again, Dworkin acknowledged the inevitable, even
fundamental, disagreement among judges as to the content of the decisive
principle that provides the best fit with this pre-existing law. Dworkin’s
task was not to quiet this disagreement, but to explain it in a manner that
is consistent with, rather than fatal to, the rule of law.63 His goal at this
stage was only to convince us that an aspiration to construct a rule of
decision that best fits with the assembled legal materials is what motivates,
and should motivate, a conscientious judge.
The final stage in Dworkin’s progress toward what he called
interpretive integrity, asks judges to try to find the “best constructive
interpretation” of the relevant law. This search, which Dworkin identified
as the dimension of “justification,” sometimes demands that the judge
examine the entire “political structure and legal doctrine” of her
community.64 This justification step is, of course, exceedingly ambitious,
abstract, and, Dworkin conceded, much more controversial than his first
two steps, especially if offered as an accurate description of what judges
do (or at least say they do) in their published opinions. What Dworkin
was seeking here is a judge’s identification of a principle which would, if
true, provide the most accurate justification of the legal system, its body
of rules, texts, cases, and interpretive tools, as a whole.65
An appeal to this kind of abstract principle of political justice is useful
to a conscientious judge in two ways. First, it can resolve controversial
questions of “fit” between competing propositions of law. And second, it
can sometimes justify disregarding an apparently settled proposition of
law in favor of one that is rooted in a sounder understanding of our legal
61. Id. at 66–67.
62. TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 59, at 118–23.
63. See, e.g., LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 239–50; TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY,
supra note 58, at 81–130.
64. TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 59, at 105–30; LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note
55, at 228–38, 255.
65. TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 59, at 81–130; LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note
55, at 239–50.
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past.66 The judge is still seeking “fit,” but at a deeper, more explicitly
political level.
The dimensions of fit and justification operate
reciprocally, each checking the other, to produce the best resolution, the
right answer, to the contested case. As Dworkin put it, a judge’s
working theory will include convictions about both fit and
justification. Convictions about fit will provide a rough threshold
requirement that an[y proposed] interpretation must meet. . . . That
threshold will eliminate interpretations that some judges would
otherwise prefer, so the brute facts of our own legal history will in this
way limit the role any judge’s personal conviction can play in his
decisions. . . . If his threshold of fit is wholly derivative from and
adjustable to his own conviction of justice so that the latter
automatically provides an eligible interpretation, then he cannot claim
in good faith to be interpreting legal practice at all . . . .
Hard cases arise, for any judge, when his threshold test does not
discriminate between two or more interpretations of some statute or
line of cases. Then he must . . . ask which shows the community’s
structure and institutions-its public standards as a whole-in a better
light from the standpoint of political morality.67

Obviously, Dworkin did not and could not claim that judges agree on
which basic principles of political morality best explain and justify our
existing law and approaches to understanding that law. On the contrary,
he argued that it is precisely their divergence at this most basic level that
best explains the profound disagreement we see among judges in
controversial cases.68 Legal disagreement is a function of clashing
political perspectives, united only by their shared roots in our legal
history. Judges are anything but umpires. They are more like applied
political philosophers.
Like Posner, Dworkin urged our actual judges to be candid about,
rather than to hide through a false pose of neutrality, the principles of
political morality which underlie their decisions.69 And he developed,
over his long and prolific career, his own account of the best justification
for our legal, particularly our constitutional, system. He began by positing
that our constitutional system rests on a particular moral theory, namely,

66.
67.
68.
105–30.
69.

See, e.g., LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 29–30, 379–99.
Id. at 255–56.
Id. at 30–47, 79–87, 254–58; TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 59, at 79–90,
See LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 239–66.
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“that citizens [do] have [certain] moral rights against the state.”70 Over
time, his argument converged on a particular moral right, that of each
citizen to be treated by government with equal concern and respect.71
Much of his work elaborated what he took to be the consequences of this
principle for particular contemporary legal controversies.72 Dworkin
tried, in short, to practice his recommended theory of interpretation.
Dworkin did not, it must be emphasized, suggest that he or any sitting
judge, past or present, did, or ever could fully measure up to the
unrealistically exacting standards of what he called interpretive integrity.73
Still, on occasion, our judges display the sort of candor and philosophical
approach he urged. The plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey,74 for example, defends women’s abortion rights on the basis of its
authors’ understanding of our Constitution’s grounding in a right of equal
participation in the political and economic life of the country.75 Similarly
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court in United States v. Virginia76
articulates an understanding of the equal protection guarantee that is
rooted in freedom from political, economic, and social subordination.77
By contrast, Justice Thomas’ dissent in U.S. Term Limits v.
Thornton78 is based on his conviction that the Constitution embodies a
union of independent states, whose sovereignty survived the Civil War
and the Amendments which followed.79 His commitment to that vision

70. TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 59, at 138.
71. Id. at 272–788; see LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 295–309, 403–04, 407–08; see
also Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185
(1981); Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 283 (1981). See generally RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985)
[hereinafter A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE].
72. See LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 379–97, 295–312; TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY,
supra note 59, at 223–39; Ronald Dworkin, In Defense of Equality, 1 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y &
POL’Y 24 (1983); see generally A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 70.
73. LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 245, 257–58, 265; TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY,
supra note 59, at 129–30.
74. See generally Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
75. Id. at 855–56 (discussing women’s rights to participate).
76. See generally United States v. Virginia, 534 U.S. 515 (1996).
77. Id. at 534, note 7.
78. See generally U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
79. Id. at 845–46 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing how the Constitution is an
agreement among states as opposed to the people).
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may also explain his reading of the Interstate Commerce Clause in cases
like U. S. v. Lopez80 and United Haulers v. Oneida-Herkimer.81
Even if these occasions are relatively rare, Dworkin’s account of
adjudication is not excessively idealistic. By offering a standard for
assessing how judges should decide cases—our question—that both takes
seriously the practices of judges as reflected in the opinions they write and
relies entirely on a commitment to accurate interpretation of past legal
sources, Dworkin has provided, if he is right, an account of the rule of law
that can withstand (though it certainly does not rebut) the indeterminacy
critique of Posner and the Legal Realists.
Dworkin’s approach also offers a justification of judge-made change
in applicable law in a system that looks entirely backward for sources of
legal authority. The sea change in our law of racial equality between
Plessy v. Ferguson82 and Brown v. Board of Education83 can be explained
by Judge Posner only as a shift in the policy preferences of the judges who
decided these cases and all those in between.84 The meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause had nothing to do with either, precisely because that
meaning is contested. And an adherent of Hart’s Rule of Recognition
would be forced to choose either to follow the “separate but equal”
precedent of Plessy, just because it was a precedent, or depart from it by
making new law (legislating from the bench), rather than declaring the
law as it is. Dworkin, by contrast, justifies Brown on the ground that it
reflects a more accurate understanding than does Plessy of the principles
of political morality that underlie our law as a whole, even if the specific
legislative history that accompanies the Fourteenth Amendment seems to
authorize racial segregation of the public schools.85
IV. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SKEPTICISM
But how could Dworkin possibly be right? The indeterminacy
elephant in the room seems to loom larger than ever if judges follow his
interpretive approach. Not only did Dworkin acknowledge rampant
disagreement among judges about how sources of law might fit together

80. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
81. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Water Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S.
330, 349 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
82. See generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
83. See generally Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
84. FEDERAL JUDICIARY, supra note 1, at 51, 104–05; HOW JUDGES THINK supra note 1,
at 279–81.
85. LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 379–92.
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to provide the right resolution of a current case; he also explicitly
introduced political conflict at the most fundamental level as the
explanation for our most profound legal disagreements. This is Legal
Realism on steroids! But Dworkin was undeterred. He denied that the
indeterminacy critique derails the prescriptive force of his argument and
audaciously even claimed that for a deciding judge, nearly every legal
dispute has a single right answer.86
Dworkin’s faith in the rule of law as a governing ideal stems from a
distinction both he and Hart87 (and many others)88 have drawn between
internal and external skepticism. Recall that both Hart and Dworkin
sought to answer our question—what should judges do?—by trying to
adopt the point of view of the judge herself—an internal perspective on
the process of adjudication—because it is that of the process’ protagonist.
We have seen that Hart’s Rule of Recognition fails to offer useful
prescriptive advice to judges tasked to decide cases framed by competing
arguments. Because it depends on agreement, or at least on consensus,
among judges, it breaks down when agreement is absent, i.e., in contested
cases.89 For Dworkin, on the other hand, legal argument begins, rather
than ends, when consensus breaks down. This is possible because most
judges reject (and all should reject) a skeptical outlook on what they do,
as they do it. They are not (and should not be) internal skeptics.90
External skepticism about the possibility of adjudication according to
law—the position expressed by the Legal Realists, critical legal studies
adherents, and, in his role as an observer or describer of judicial practice,
Judge Posner—is of a different sort. External skeptics point to the
unrelenting controversy in law—the judicial appointments based on
ideology, the ever longer list of 5–4 Supreme Court decisions, the clashes
between originalism and the “living” Constitution and between reliance
on text versus purpose in statutory interpretation—and remind us of what
we know only too well: that there is, as Judge Posner correctly observes,

86. TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 59, at 279–90.
87. HART, supra note 26, at 134–36, 143.
88. See generally THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE (Oxford Press 1986);
HILARY PUTNAM, PRAGMATISM: AN OPEN QUESTION (Oxford Press 1995) [hereinafter
PRAGMATISM]; HILARY PUTNAM, REALISM WITH A HUMAN FACE (James F. Conant ed. 1990)
[hereinafter REALISM]; HILARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY (Cambridge Univ.
Press 1981); RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (Princeton Univ.
Press 1979); Bernard Williams, Internal and External Reasons, in MORAL LUCK 101 (1981).
89. See supra notes 26–53 and accompanying text.
90. LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 76–86, 266–75; TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra
note 59, at 279–90.
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“no analytical method for determining who is right—no settled means of
enforcing agreement or concession.”91 For the external skeptic, no
interpretation of our legal sources can be right, or, worse, even useful
because none of them can be proven either correct or incorrect. Dworkin
was agnostic about the truth of external skepticism92 but rejected its
dismissive consequences for legal interpretation.93 We might go further
than Dworkin and concede that controversy is pervasive not just in law,
but in, at least, all the disciplines that seek to understand human behavior
and society, and that none of the disciplines seem to have settled standards
for resolving their disputes.94 Even the natural sciences, as the
philosopher of science Larry Laudan has shown, do not enjoy agreed upon
criteria for assessing the validity of competing claims on disputed
questions of truth made by their practitioners.95
It may be that only God, or the end of history, can quiet external
skepticism. But that, Dworkin argued, is irrelevant to what we humans do
every day in all of our practices, from fiction writing to the study of
history, to economic analysis, to every other human effort at
understanding, including judges’ efforts to decide cases under law.96 As
we engage in any of these practices, we are (or should be) aware that none
of our approaches, methods, or conclusions can be proven right, and that
all of them are inevitably influenced by our backgrounds and the
dispositions we carry with us—by our priors, as Judge Posner would have
it. And yet, unlike the external skeptic, none of us is (or at least should
be) a practicing skeptic. None of us believes that the products of our own
inquiries are arbitrary, though we of course must concede that they may
be wrong or inadequate, and are always subject to revision and
reassessment. Instead, we believe that our work is, to the best of our
ability, accurate and correct. From our internal perspective, it provides
the single, if provisional, right answer to whatever problem we were

91. See THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, supra note 1, at 54–55.
92. LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 80, 206.
93. Id. at 83–85, 269–71.
94. See generally E. H. CARR, WHAT IS HISTORY? (1961); ALVIN WARD GOULDNER,
THE COMING CRISIS IN WESTERN SOCIOLOGY (1970); THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, (Univ. of Chicago Press 1962); RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY,
IRONY AND SOLIDARITY (Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) [hereinafter CONTINGENCY); RICHARD
RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (Princeton Univ. Press 1979) [hereinafter
PHILOSOPHY].
95. LARRY LAUDAN, SCIENCE AND RELATIVISM: SOME KEY CONTROVERSIES IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (1990).
96. See LAW’S EMPIRE, supra, note 55, 45–86, 225–75.
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seeking to solve.97 The fact that historians disagree about, say, whether
the Dred Scott decision was a significant cause of the Civil War, and that
their competing positions are influenced by the different lived experiences
they bring to the inquiry, does not mean that their work does not aid in our
understanding of our past, or that their disagreements are not about
history. Most importantly, it does not mean that instead of doing the best
historical research they can, they should throw up their hands and each
say that Dred Scott means what they prefer that it mean and that’s all there
is or can be to the matter. The practice of judging according to law,
Dworkin would argue, merits no less respect.
Posner’s contrary position, Dworkin has argued, reflects the corrosive
and unwarranted influence of external skepticism on the internal practice
of judging.98 Posner has become what Hart called a disappointed
absolutist.99 Because he rightly understands that no meaningful
proposition or law can be proven true, Posner the theorist has concluded
that claims to have interpreted law correctly have no value and should be
jettisoned in favor of the imposition of the judges’ social policy
preferences.100 Posner the theorist, however, acknowledges that Posner
the judge has sometimes written opinions that purport to engage in legal
interpretation.101 Perhaps these opinions are a bad faith cover for the
preferences of Posner, the social engineer. Perhaps they are hypocritical
gestures of obeisance to an ideal he now rejects. Or perhaps, they
represent what he really thinks about the law. It is not easy to actually
practice internal skepticism.
V. FALLIBILISM AS A MODEL FOR JUDGING
The outlook on adjudication advanced by Dworkin is an example of
an approach to human inquiry known as fallibilism. Fallibilism is a strain
of the American pragmatist tradition in philosophy that developed in the
last quarter of the nineteenth century.102 The connection is ironic because
97. TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 59, at 282–83.
98. LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 94–95, 146–48, 157–64.
99. HART, supra note 26, at 35.
100. See supra notes 11–25 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Khan v. State Oil, 93 F.3d 1358 (7th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 522 U.S. 3 (1997);
DIVERGENT PATHS, supra note 1, at 176–78; Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation in the
Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 UNIV. OF CHI. L. REV. 800 (1983).
102. The founders of American pragmatism were C.S. Peirce, John Dewey and William
James. Some of their most important works are: JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE
(1925); JOHN DEWEY, THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY (1929); CHARLES S. PEIRCE, REASONING
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Dworkin claimed to reject pragmatism entirely, associating it with
Posner’s skepticism about law and consequent embrace of unbridled
judicial policymaking.103 Some thinkers in the pragmatist tradition,
Justice Holmes for example,104 Posner himself and the eminent American
philosopher, Richard Rorty,105 are indeed skeptics. But its founders,
William James, John Dewey, and C.S. Peirce,106 and more contemporary
adherents like Hilary Putnam,107 Cornel West,108 Margaret Radin,109 and
Ian Shapiro,110 definitely are not.
Fallibilism views inquiry of any sort as an activity that seeks to
appease doubt by producing belief.111 This definition precisely captures
the form taken by judicial deliberation. A judge faced with competing
legal positions in a case does not know, in advance of considering the
arguments for each of them, which is right and is obligated to be open to
both sides. The point of the judge’s evaluation of the parties’ arguments
is to arrive at a belief that one of them is sounder than the other. Arrival
at this belief assuages the obligatory uncertainty with which the inquiry
began. This is all a judge (or anyone) can do, but as C.S. Peirce put it, it
is enough:
With the doubt, therefore, the struggle begins, and with the cessation
of doubt it ends. Hence, the sole object of inquiry is the settlement of
opinion. We may fancy that this is not enough for us, and that we
seek, not merely an opinion, but a true opinion. But put this fancy to
the test, and it proves groundless; for as soon as a firm belief is reached
we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be true or false. . . . The
most that can be maintained is, that we seek for a belief that we shall
AND THE LOGIC OF THINGS (Harvard Univ. Press 1993); CHARLES S. PEIRCE, HOW TO MAKE
OUR IDEAS CLEAR (1968); William James, The Will to Believe, Philosophical Conceptions and
Practical Results in PRAGMATISM (1975) 247–70; Charles S. Peirce, The Fixation of Belief, 12

Popular Sci. Monthly 1–15 (1877), http://www.bocc.ubi.pt/pag/peirce-charles-fixationbelief.pdf [https://perma.cc/SM75-57WJ].
103. LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 55, at 151–75.
104. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARVARD L. REV. 457 (1897);
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in
Science and Science in Law, 12 HARVARD L. REV. 443 (1899).
105. See generally CONTINGENCY supra note 94; PHILOSOPHY, supra note 94.
106. See supra note 102 and accompanying sources.
107. See generally REALISM, supra note 88; PRAGMATISM, supra note 88.
108. See generally CORNEL WEST, THE AMERICAN EVASION OF PHILOSOPHY (1989).
109. See generally M. J. Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV.
1699 (1990).
110. See generally IAN SHAPIRO, POLITICAL CRITICISM (1990).
111. See generally JOHN P. MURPHY, PRAGMATISM FROM PEIRCE TO DAVIDSON 21–32
(1993).
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think to be true. But we think each one of our beliefs to be true, and,
indeed, it is mere tautology to say so.112

Though Peirce was not addressing adjudication in particular here, but
inquiry generally, this description explains how judges, save for any so
riddled by internal skepticism that they cannot budge from their initial
doubts, decide cases. What distinguishes their inquiry, their specific
march from uncertainty to resolution, from doubt to belief, is that their
subject matter is what the law applicable to the case before them requires.
And for Dworkin, what the law requires is the outcome that grows out of
the best interpretation of the relevant legal texts and precedents. That
interpretation, in turn, is the one which fits best with these sources, taken
as a whole, seen through the lens offered by the political principles that
best explain and justify them.
For Peirce, the beliefs generated by inquiry are final once arrived at,
in the sense that they have put doubt to rest, just as a judge’s opinion is
final (for her) once her opinion is signed and her order entered. But at the
same time, the process of resolving doubt is tentative and experimental in
spirit. It claims only to have resolved the particular doubt (the case) that
begat it, and in that way to have added to the resources available to us to
resolve future doubts (to have become a part of the body of precedents).
But the beliefs produced by inquiry recognize their own fallibility,
because, as Peirce acknowledged, the most that inquiry can yield is a
belief that “we shall think to be true.”113 We must acknowledge, insist
even, that all of our beliefs are subject to revision upon further inquiry, by
ourselves and by our community.
Judicial opinions are necessarily fallible in this way. They are, and
can only be, the best product their authors can offer. Because they are
generated in a system of law that looks backwards, they do, just by virtue
of their existence, become part of the body of law that binds their authors’
successors, but only part. The proposition of law announced by any
particular opinion may rightly be altered or reversed by a subsequent
opinion that rests on a sounder understanding of the law as a whole.
This fallibilistic understanding of adjudication emphatically does not
embrace Posner’s skepticism about legal reasoning. Fallibilism is antiskeptical, insisting that there are right answers to contested legal questions
from the internal perspective of those who participate in the system of

112. CHARLES S. PEIRCE, PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF PEIRCE 10, 11 (Justus Buchler
ed. 1955).
113. Id. (emphasis in original).
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adjudication, the judges themselves.114 But it also humbly acknowledges,
as the pragmatist philosopher Hilary Putnam put it, “there are no
metaphysical guarantees to be had that our most firmly held beliefs will
never need revision.”115 For the fallibilist, the process of inquiry, reexamination, and revision never ends. Or, more teleologically, it ends
only when it hits upon “the opinion which is fated to be agreed to by all
who investigate.”116 That, as Peirce put it, is what we mean by the truth,117
notwithstanding Richard Rorty's admonition that “there is no method of
knowing when one has reached the truth or when one is closer to it than
before.”118 In the meantime, life and inquiry (including by judges) go on,
in search of that truth, unfazed by its elusiveness.
VI. SOME PROMISING CONSEQUENCES OF FALLIBILISM
What are the consequences for our question—how should judges
decide cases—if a fallibilist understanding of truth is right, and especially
if Dworkin’s account of judging is right, too? First, the observations of
the legal realists, the critical legal studies movement, and Judge Posner
about how judges work no longer threaten the integrity of the rule of law.
Of course, all judges bring extra-legal priors—the influences of
upbringing, race, gender, sexual orientation, social class, religious
background, personal values and worldview—to the task of deciding
cases. We all carry our priors to all of our tasks because as Hart reminded
us, we are not gods, but only humans.119 In this respect, judges are no
more hampered by their priors than historians, economists, philosophers,
sociologists, or any other practitioners of inquiry into any aspect of the
human situation.
Priors are the inevitable conditions under which judges engage in the
practice of legal interpretation. To the extent their priors distort how
judges carry out this practice, as they invariably do, their work product—
their opinions—is subject to evaluation, criticism, and, if the criticism is
justified, eventual correction, so long as the practice itself has integrity.
Dworkin’s signal contribution was to offer an account of legal

114. PRAGMATISM, supra note 88, at 19–21; MURPHY, supra note 111, at 9-31; TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 59, at 79–90.
115. PRAGMATISM, supra note 88, at 21.
116. See PEIRCE, supra note 112, at 38.
117. Id.
118. RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 165 (Univ. of Minn. Press,
1982).
119. HART, supra note 26, at 115.
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interpretation, which, if correct, provides that integrity. If judicial
opinions can be tested against the standard Dworkin proposes, to resolve
each case in the way which best fits with the relevant law as seen through
the lens of the political principles which best justify that law, we have
done all we can to eliminate the distorting influence of judicial priors.
The same is true of the indeterminacy critique of legal interpretation.
Of course, the best reading of extant legal materials as applied to particular
disputes is indeterminate, that is, contested, uncertain and often deeply
controversial. If legal disputes could be settled formulaically, by some
agreed upon method or algorithm, we would have no need for judges, or
even lawyers, at all. We could similarly enter the relevant data (the facts)
and agreed upon legal materials (the law) into a computer and wait a
second or two for the software to spit out the result. We need adjudication
through legal interpretation because of the indeterminacy of legal
argument. Interpretation begins just where agreement ends, not viceversa. The point of the interpretative inquiry is, as the pragmatists teach
us, to allow the interpreter to move from uncertainty to her own belief.
This belief, made concrete by the judge’s opinion and order, resolves the
dispute. But it is offered, as it must be, with awareness of its own
fallibility, with knowledge that it may be “fated”120 to be overruled if later
found to be inconsistent with a for that law sounder reading of the law
taken as a whole.
Second, if Dworkin’s account of legal interpretation is right, some
fundamental political disagreements among judges are, unlike “priors,”
internal to, rather than distortions of, legal interpretation. Dworkin’s call
for judges to move beyond a search for outcomes that cohere best with
pre-existing law (important as that is) to those that also reflect the best
political justification for that law, and indeed for our entire legal system,
assures that controversy about political theory will and should play a
major part in the adjudicative process. If this call is justified, we should
not be dismayed by the endemic ideological strife that has come to
dominate discourse in and about the U.S. Supreme Court at least since the
dawn of legal realism more than a century ago.
Dworkin’s insistence on the centrality of political argument to legal
interpretation is no doubt the most controversial part of his account of
adjudication. It grows out of the American legal system’s grounding in
the United States Constitution, a document that is at once an enforceable
legal text, an iteration of a republican theory of political governance, and

120. See PEIRCE, supra note 112, at 115.
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an aspiration to political and social justice (“We the people, in order to
form a more perfect union”).121 Republican theory is, of course, complex
and contested; complex in that it contains multiple elements (federalism,
representative democracy, divided national power, individual rights, a
second founding after the Civil War); and contested because we the people
disagree about the primacy of these constituent elements when they are in
tension and about the best understanding of each of them. And it goes
without saying that our disagreements about basic questions of justice are
likely to be resolved only in the very, very long run, if ever. It is thus both
inevitable and quite proper that an American judge’s effort to understand
the law which governs her resolution of the cases before her will be shaped
by the political principles which she believes provide the best explanation
and justification for the Constitution.
To recognize that political disagreement is integral to legal
interpretation has important implications for our process of confirming
presidential nominations to the federal judiciary. First, the Senate should
work as hard to uncover and examine nominees’ basic political
commitments as it does to evaluate their professional background, life
experience, and general approach to the interpretive craft of judging. This
will not be easy. Nominees, and the presidents who appoint them, will
resist (as they do now) any exploration of their political ideas as irrelevant
to the judicial role and, perhaps in the same breath, as intrusive into
judicial independence. And of course, requests that nominees declare how
they might rule on hypothetical future cases would indeed compromise
their overriding obligation to hear and evaluate the arguments presented
in the real cases they will be asked to decide. But nominees ought to be
pressed on their present views on disputed issues of constitutional
interpretation. Among these might be the merit of originalism as a source
of constitutional meaning, the importance of and limits on the role of
precedent in constitutional adjudication, whether people have rights that
are not specifically enumerated in the Constitution’s text, and whether the
president’s exercise of Article II executive power is constrained by other
constitutional limits. These are just examples, almost random ones, from
a potential list from which different questions will matter more or less to
different senators.
In a similar vein, senators should not shy away from asking nominees
to provide their assessments of particular Supreme Court decisions, not
just the results announced by these decisions, but the interpretive

121. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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approaches taken by the justices responsible for them. Again, nominees
can be expected to resist. But senators may be capable of being
unapologetically persistent. If they are, and especially if they can also
explain to the public why a nominee’s views of our constitutional history,
and of the political ideas which underlie it, are essential components of
her qualifications, it is possible that our present, desultory and largely
pointless confirmation process will gradually improve.
Senators should also be prepared to deny confirmation to a judicial
nominee on explicitly political grounds. Ideally, our presidents and
senators, recognizing that disagreement about the political principles that
best justify our law is a necessary part of legal interpretation, would seek
a judiciary in which the distribution of political commitments roughly
mirrors that of the country. If that was the aim of our elected leaders, the
political values of any given nominee should rarely be disqualifying,
because her confirmation would not threaten the overall balance and
diversity among judges on basic questions of political principle. Sadly,
our own political world is at some distance from this ideal, and has been
for a long time.122 When presidents seek to dominate the judicial branch
through relentless appointment of judges on the sole ground of shared
ideological commitment, senators who do not share the president’s
ideology are justified in resisting this domination by withholding
confirmation, where they can, of the president’s nominees.
The third consequence of Dworkin’s interpretive account of
adjudication grows out of its call on judges to look exclusively backward
for the sources of law that justify their resolution of cases. When judges
disagree, their dispute is about the meaning of these pre-existing sources
and not about the resolution of the case that, according to their views as
policy analysts, would yield the greatest benefit to society. Even at
Dworkin’s final interpretive stage, that of political justification, a judge’s
commitment is to the principle or principles that best explain these preexisting sources. Whatever the inevitable distorting effects of judicial
priors, legal controversies are still actually about law, and the right
answers to these controversies are those generated by the best
interpretation of that law. By what it includes—fidelity to the
Constitution, statutes, and previous cases, and the principles which
underlie them, and what it excludes—the judge’s personal background,
identity, and policy preferences, Dworkin’s standard for evaluating
judicial opinions satisfies the minimum criteria for adjudication under law

122. See Ruiz et al., supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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suggested at the beginning of this essay: the grounds for a judge’s decision
(1) are not created by the judge herself and (2) provide a way to distinguish
legal from non-legal reasons to support the decision. A society where
judges’ work is measured by its adherence to this standard is one that is
governed by “laws and not men” [sic], one where the rule of law may
accurately be said to prevail.
Dworkin’s goal of restricting judges from policy-making by limiting
their role to the interpretation of extant legal sources serves another basic,
if obvious, value in a society, like our own, that is committed to
democratic governance. In a democracy, the people, or the people’s
elected representatives, are the policymakers, constrained only by
Constitutional limitations. The primary vehicle for implementing the
people’s policy choices is positive law, often in the form of statutes,
sometimes by regulations promulgated under the authority of statutes,
sometimes through executive orders. Less often, but not infrequently, the
people make policy directly, through initiative and referendum. And, of
course, it is “we the people,” who established the aspiration to a more
perfect Union given legal effect by the United States Constitution. When
judges strive to provide the best interpretation of these sources of law, they
honor democratic rule by implementing the policies established by the
people. If they instead view their power to decide cases under law as a
warrant to impose their own policy views, they both diminish democracy
and undermine their own legitimacy.
A fourth and final point is suggested by the pragmatists’ admonition
to all of us to acknowledge the fallibility of our beliefs, of even our most
fundamental convictions. As a judge proceeds from the position of doubt
she must adopt at the beginning of a case through the process of
adjudicating it, she should be mindful that her proposed resolution is based
only on the “belief [she] thinks shall be true.”123 That, of course, is all
any belief or conclusion can ever be, and a judge cannot help but rely on
it. But even as she announces her belief, her rationale for her decision,
she should acknowledge to herself that it may be wrong, that another
interpretation, one she has rejected or perhaps didn’t even consider, may
rightly come to supplant it.
For a judge who follows Dworkin, this attitude of fallibility extends
to her beliefs about how existing law best fits together and to the political
principles which best explain and justify that law, and the legal system
taken as a whole. A judge can and must hold convictions, sometimes deep

123. See PEIRCE, supra note 112.
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ones, about all these matters. But she must remain open to the possibility
of revising, even rejecting, any or all of them, under the compulsion of a
new and better argument.
CONCLUSION
Alexander Hamilton may have, to some extent, anticipated this
pragmatic outlook in his defense of judicial review in Federalist 78.
Famously, Hamilton argued for the authority of judges to have the final
say on questions of law by pointing out that they can legitimately exercise
“neither force nor will, but merely judgment.”124 The domain of force,
under our Constitution, is that of the Executive Branch.125 The legitimate
exercise of will is shared by the Executive and Congress, but not by
judges. Our problem—how judges should decide cases—centers on
whether this division of power is possible. Posner, the Legal Realists, and
critical legal studies adherents argue, in effect, that it is not, that any effort
to explain judgment as separate from an exercise of will must founder,
taking the rule of law down with it.
Hamilton obviously disagreed. And though he did not provide a
detailed explanation of how it differed from “will,” his choice of the
phrase “merely judgment” is illuminating. Each word deserves equal
emphasis. “Judgment” at the least refers at least to the non-mechanical,
non-algorithmic character of adjudication. Deciding cases requires
judgment, not calculation. It was the aim of both Dworkin and the
pragmatists to show that its exercise is not an illusion. But Hamilton’s
choice of “merely” as a modifier is also intriguing. Perhaps he meant it
ironically, as a subtle acknowledgment of how much power the judicial
branch might in fact come to wield, using only its single tool. But if, on
the other hand, he was guileless in characterizing the exercise of judgment
as “mere,” he captured the essence of the pragmatic outlook. A
practitioner of mere judgment is always aware of her human limits.
Because she knows her judgments are fallible, she will reach them only
after carefully considering all arguments, and with deep respect for
opposing perspectives. She will strive to keep an open mind with respect
to the questions she must decide. Above all, she will proceed with an
attitude of deep humility. She “thinks her beliefs are true,” of course. She
has no choice. But she knows that sooner or later, they might, for good
reason, come to be displaced.
124. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 575 (Alexander Hamilton) (McLean’s ed., 2008),
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed78.asp [https://perma.cc/9T5M-7DNJ].
125. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 9.
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The exercise of “mere judgment,” in this sense, may capture the
highest aspiration of the American tradition of judicial review. There are
good reasons to believe that those among us who are, or become judges
are capable, in principle, of exercising it, or at least trying to. If they can,
our claim to be governed by the rule of law, may not be hollow. At any
rate, we ought to be very slow to give up on the aspiration.

